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Abstract
This article looks at the challenge posed to the liberal field of journalism by Tea Party 
populism and Fox News’ attempt to claim the cultural capital of journalism. The Tea 
Party have defied expectations of a political and rhetorical normalization, declaring 
liberalism and the New York Times as iredeemable enemies of the populist people. The 
Times’ coverage of the Tea Party, analyzed in this article, assumes an importance beyond 
merely covering a political story as it articulates the present state of the field and its 
understanding of the political. What this author finds is a normative liberal universalist 
interpretation of the Tea Party movement between the pessimissm of Lippmann or the 
redemptive humanism of Dewey. The populists are either treated as irrational pseudo-
political actors or the credibility of the field is bestowed upon them as the redemptive 
embodiment of democracy. Neither approach is able to explain populism’s immutable 
antagonism at an ontological level or the persistence of the Tea Party’s fetishized notion 
of an America reconciled in private property.
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Introduction
The right-wing populist amalgam known as the Tea Party movement has had a profound 
impact upon American politics and discourse since its emergence in 2009. Tea Party 
populism has been responsible for the mid-term electoral successes of the Republican 
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party, legislative gridlock in Congress, the unbecoming spectacle of the 2012 presiden-
tial primaries and the government shutdown. The Tea Party have bedeviled American 
liberals in their immutable antagonism and imperviousness to President Barack Obama’s 
conciliatory tones. This deep political dysfunction poses a fundamental threat to 
American liberalism and democratic governance. The centrality of this entanglement to 
the field of journalism (Bourdieu, 1998) is not simply a question of an important political 
story but rather the way in which the field has been drawn into this struggle. The ‘elite-
liberal media’, long a populist target of derision on Fox News, are centrally implicated as 
an enemy of the mythical ‘people’ of populism. Perhaps more importantly in embodying 
‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2005), the Tea Party undermine the normative public imagined 
by the liberal field of journalism. They defy a rational individualism, humanist notions 
of democracy, consensus politics or technocratic attempts to manage away antagonism. 
Therefore, the manner in which this story is reported assumes a significance beyond 
curating the historical record; it is a matter of defending the values of the field. In analys-
ing the response to the populist challenge, I underline below where the values of the field 
fall short and how to begin to conceptualize a political notion of the field.
This article will draw upon the theoretical insights of Discourse Theory (Dahlberg 
and Phelan, 2011; Laclau, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) to explain both populism and 
the liberal notion of the political underpinning the field of journalism. Discourse Theory, 
as a multi-disciplinary approach encompassing psychoanalysis, critical and political 
theory, offers a level of complexity to questions of political ontology that can be of great 
benefit to journalism studies. Discourse Theory holds that the political as antagonism is 
the essential precondition of politics with identity articulated through logics of difference 
and equivalence, and the friend/enemy dichotomy (Dahlberg and Phelan, 2011:19). 
Conversely, the field of journalism stands for a universalism and truth that is inclusive 
and constitutive of the liberal-democratic public. In both ontologies, universality is cen-
tral; however where the field holds that all can have access to rationality and universal 
truths, populism claims exclusive access to the universal as privileged agents of history 
engaged in righteous struggle. Where the liberal political class attempt to find common 
ground, the Tea Party are invested in the spectral figure of Obama-as-enemy (Jutel, 2012) 
threatening the virtuous people.
In assessing the impact of this struggle upon the liberal field of journalism, I conduct 
a close analysis of The New York Times’ coverage of the Tea Party movement. Texts are 
considered embodiments of the cultural capital and journalistic habitus of the field pos-
sessing certain ontological assumptions and normative notions of the polity. The Times 
exemplifies the cultural capital of the field as the American paper of record concerned 
with unifying the public through the pursuit of a universal truth. I find that the field fails 
to properly explain the political as a consequence of this desire for a liberal universalism. 
The treatment of the political in the texts of the Times is caught within a humanist/pathol-
ogy framework where the movement is either validated as embodying authentic grass-
roots struggle or is pathologized as an aberration. What pervades in the humanist 
treatment are portraits of everyday people who have become politicized by an austerity 
populism and morality. In these humanist portrayals, the cultural capital of the field is 
deployed to reinforce the authentic Tea Party imaginary which is central to its fetishistic 
mode of politics. These humanist profiles of the Tea Party are premised upon the shared 
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terrain of liberal-democracy; however, there is an inability to recognize the Tea Party’s 
authentic illiberalism.
While a populist humanism predominates in the straight news formats of the Times, 
the opinion pages offer a pathology critique of the Tea Party. Humanism and pathology 
constitute a dichotomy in the sense that both are based within liberal notions of the politi-
cal, between the poles of optimism and pessimism or between Dewey and Lippmann. 
The humanist view of the political draws on Dewey and the redemptive quality of the Tea 
Party’s active participation in the production of ‘social knowledge’ (DeCesare, 2012: 
107). Conversely, the pathology critique bears Lippmann’s distrust of the public’s demo-
cratic competence, treating them as pseudo-actors who threaten expert knowledge. 
Where humanism regards all political agency as redeemable, the pathology treatment 
reduces the Tea Party to an acting-out of base human impulses from fear, racism and cor-
ruption. The political thus becomes something to be technocratically managed away and 
is not suggestive of a broader crisis of liberal-democracy.
Within the pathology narrative, the Tea Party’s vociferous resistance to Obama is pre-
dominately understood as a retrograde politics of racism and inter-generational anxiety, 
accompanied by a multi-cultural triumphalism which sees the Tea Party as the last gasp of 
the Southern Strategy in the face of irreversible demographic shifts. Race plays a critical 
role in Tea Party ontology, but this cannot be explained by traditional markers of race, 
rather by a neo-liberal – Randian-style – racism that identifies the urban working class, 
immigrants, intellectuals, liberals and welfare recipients as parasites upon the productive. 
The Koch brothers have also served as a useful liberal foil. While their funding of libertar-
ian causes through think-tanks and advocacy groups is undoubtedly important, this rein-
forces the standard liberal critique of the political as avarice. It is easier to assume that Tea 
Partiers are misled by robber barons than it is to accept that movement adherents really do 
believe with passionate intensity. There is no attempt to answer the Thomas Frank ques-
tions of why they believe and what this radical inversion of American populism portends.
Following their 2010 electoral success, the Tea Party defied expectations of a political 
normalization as good-faith opponents capable of forging a workable consensus. The Times 
offered then a forceful re-iteration of the field’s notions of tolerance and civility, particu-
larly in response to the Tucson shootings and the brinksmanship pursued by congressional 
Republicans in debt-ceiling negotiations. Just as the Tea Party are having their greatest 
impact upon the polity, they are designated beyond the pale. This defence represents an 
overcompensation for the Times’ inability to properly explain the nature and origins of the 
Tea Party’s militant belief. What pervades is a snarky liberalism that assumes a certain 
cultural superiority, revelling in mocking the Tea Party’s lack of sophistication, and enables 
the field to disavow its own inadequacies. What is critically important for the journalistic 
field and liberal-democracy more broadly is not merely the failure to defend itself, but ced-
ing of notions of universality to the populists. Lacking the political and conceptual terms to 
deal with populism, The New York Times bestows liberal credibility upon the Tea Party.
Populism and the political
Discourse theory and the ontological principle of ‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2005) offer 
journalism studies important insights into populism and social movements. Champions 
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of the field may reject that they lack the theoretical tools to explain populism; the field 
and the values of the ‘high modern paradigm’ (Hallin, 1992) of journalism emerged 
alongside the mass public movements of the 20th century. Consequently, a liberal pater-
nalistic concern for educating the masses – protecting the ‘bewildered herd’ from itself 
(Lippmann, 1993: 145) – has been hardwired into the field. Thus, the field has held to 
normative liberal notions of the political as party politics, ‘the scramble for office and the 
politics of patronage’ (Schmitt, 1996: 32). However, with the crisis of public institutions 
from unions and political parties in the era of neo-liberal post-politics, new forms of 
populism defy technocratic liberal pedagogy. Discourse theory here offers a concept of 
political ontology opposed to liberal power-politics. The political in discourse theory is 
understood as the ‘antagonism that is internal to human relations’ (Mouffe, 2000: 101) 
while politics is the attempt to formalize and manage away this antagonism.
Discourse theory holds that antagonism is not simply a breakdown of communication, 
but it is the fundamental discursive act of identity in constituting political movement. In 
contrast to Habermas’ liberal model of communicative action, language is not ‘the 
medium of reconciliation and mediation’ but ‘a violent medium of immediate and raw 
confrontation’ (Žižek, 2008b: 60). The populist act of articulating ‘the people’ creates 
discursive chains of difference/equivalence (Laclau, 2005: 78) that radically divide the 
social space between the people and their enemy. The political defies rational consensus 
as the people’s opponent is an enemy to be eliminated, rather than an adversary within 
the shared terrain of liberal-democracy. In the case of the Tea Party, various strands of the 
conservative movement (i.e. evangelicals, libertarians, palaeo-conservatives, the patriot/
militia movement) form hegemonic links of equivalence around Obama-as-enemy. For 
the populist, the enemy is what stands between them and ‘the fully reconciled society’ 
(Laclau, 2005: 119) and their realization as the universal class. While the illiberalism of 
populism is self-evident, the claim to universality while disavowing liberal self-reflexive 
practices should be of principle concern to the field.
The notion of the political, as articulated in discourse theory, clearly delineates the 
ontological differences between populism and the liberal field of journalism. While these 
theoretical distinctions may at times be difficult to turn into journalistic insights, Žižek’s 
departure from Laclau provides a way to think about the ontic in populism, according 
with journalism’s search for facts and context. For Laclau (2005), populism is ‘political 
reason tout court’ (p. 229). ‘The People’ is an indeterminate subject position born of the 
heterogeneity of the social space with no privileged antagonism or social actors, in con-
trast to classical Marxism. The efficacy of populism derives from the ‘radical invest-
ment’ (Laclau, 2005: 71) in the signifier, ‘the people’ or ‘Tea Party’, which functions as 
a placeholder for myriad desires and projections. Laclau characterizes the process as 
contingent with political movements forming and dissolving only so long as the signifier 
has utility/symbolic efficiency.
Žižek (2008a) identifies in the category of ‘the people’ a fundamentally fetishistic 
logic at work, which precludes the contingency and fluidity of Laclau’s politics of het-
erogeneity. Populism cannot overcome its enemy as its presence is essential to experi-
encing a fetishist jouissance or ‘obscene enjoyment’ (Žižek, 2008a: 90) in transgressing 
civil norms. As the privileged universal people of populism, the Tea Party can engage in 
reckless rhetoric, dehumanize their opponents, claim the mantle of Martin Luther King 
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Jr even as they designate Obama as ‘other’ and bring government to a stand-still. The Tea 
Party fetishists cannot simply be rationally persuaded to abandon their identity once 
satisfied in their fetishes: ‘they experience no need to be rid of them’ (Žižek, 2008a: 68). 
Sustaining the illusion of an America reconciled in private property, the Second 
Amendment and evangelical Christianity, necessitates the existence of Obama or liberals 
as the foreign, socialist, Islamic threat to the republic and capitalism (Jutel, 2012).
Žižek distinguishes populism from authentic emancipatory politics by reference to 
political economy, however not in a teleological Marxist sense. For Žižek (2008a), an 
emancipatory event would materialize the Lacanian ‘Real’, an excess which defies sym-
bolic representation ‘as the impossible hard core which we cannot confront directly … 
[yet] always returns to its place’ (p. 127). Political economy is the displaced Real that 
defines both the Tea Party’s fetishistic politics and Laclau’s politics of heterogeneity. The 
Tea Party maintain their fetish of free markets and private property by treating existing 
neo-liberalism as the corruption of capitalism by a contradictory network of enemies 
from Obama, Wall Street, liberals, academics, corporations, environmentalists, immi-
grants and globalists. Thus, the Tea Party reanimate a ‘populist republicanism’ (Goebel, 
1997) running through different iterations of American populism, from the Populist 
Party to the right-wing backlash, namely, a productivism that sees capitalism as a moral 
order embodied in the small businessman or small-holder.
In approaching populist ontology through discourse theory, it becomes clear how the 
universalism of the field of journalism and populism is irreconcilable. Yet, aside from 
this more abstract academic point, there are also ontic insights of historical and national 
context with which journalism can approach Tea Party populism. The tools of journalism 
could be deployed in addressing the historical context of the Tea Party iconography and 
why they elicit fetishistic investment. In this sense, journalism might be able to rational-
ize the irrational of populism without either giving it democratic legitimacy or patholo-
gizing it as a passing fit. Finally, discourse theory should pique the interest of journalism 
researchers and practitioners in formulating a political articulation of liberalism and the 
field of journalism. While the task is too large for this article, Mouffe’s notion of media 
and journalism as ‘an agonistic public space’ (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 6) may 
be of some utility here.
The liberal field of journalism
Bourdieu’s (1996, 1998) field theory is critical to understanding the emergence of journal-
ism as a discipline which embodies liberal political ontology at its most idealistic. Field 
theory offers a sociology of journalism that does not reduce the discipline to economic 
functionalism, as do many critical political economy of the media accounts. At the level 
of textual analysis, there is an understanding of the social conditions of production, jour-
nalistic practice and its underpinning autonomous values. A cultural field depends upon 
the creation of professional habitus and cultural capital that are differentiated from the 
broader field of power, the ‘dominant principle of domination’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 265). The 
field of journalism possesses a potent notion of universality and cultural capital based on 
realizing the public or ‘the people’. The cultural capital of the field is an important form 
of social symbolic power for constructing political identity. This symbolic power allows 
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the media a concentration of resources in being able ‘to describe the social itself … [and] 
the inequalities in the social world’ (Couldry, 2003: 39). Following Laclau, this is the 
power to declare the plebs as populous – the political act of universalization. Phelan 
(2011) demonstrates how in both field and discourse theory universality plays the same 
ontological role, whether in creating the field as an autonomous pursuit resisting the field 
of power or as the horizon of politics making political identity possible. In the face of the 
populist challenge, the field of journalism should be concerned with an antagonistic 
defence of its universal values of rationalism, reflexivity and truth-telling.
The modern field of liberal journalism has sought to develop a particular public and 
polity in response to the radical indeterminacy of popular uprisings, labour militancy 
and the spectre of fascism in the early 20th century. The journalist functions as the dis-
passionate technocrat of the liberal-democratic public sphere that through ‘objective’ 
methods renders facts intelligible to a public that is ‘assumed to be engaged in a rational 
process of seeking information’ (Baym, 2010: 32). The public is conceived in liberal 
terms not merely in its rational pursuit of enlightenment but in its consensual and inclu-
sive nature. Muhlmann (2008) writes that modern journalism’s self-validation as an 
autonomous field lies in its claim ‘to bring people together … [by] … giving readers the 
‘truth’ … something that is acceptable to all, beyond differences of opinion’ (p. 6). 
Thus, the values and practices of the field represent a claim to universality and political 
truth that is, ontologically speaking, unantagonistic. The journalistic habitus therefore 
sees itself occupying a position ‘above the fray’ as a social arbiter curating the historical 
record.
Like all social fields, journalism is split between poles of valorization – the cultural 
capital of unifying the liberal public and an economic capital defined by marketshare and 
ratings. The success of Fox News is not simply attributable to cornering the conservative 
news market but appropriating the values of the field while collapsing the poles of valori-
zation. This is how we can understand the ludicrous pretensions to the cultural capital of 
the field in Fox’s slogans ‘We Report, You Decide’ and ‘Fair & Balanced’ while brow-
beating its competitors with its status as ‘#1’ in news. This inter-field struggle is central 
to the story of the Tea Party, not simply because of a populist congruence, but in the 
manner that Fox circulated and centralized Tea Party iconography.1 Fox’s celebration of 
‘the people’ represents the ultimate convergence of the field’s economic and cultural 
poles. Protestors consume Fox as active participants in the production of a hegemonic 
epistemology, simultaneously performing ‘free labour’ (Terranova, 2004) by producing 
the spectacle of protest that Fox covers in its broadcasts.
By contrast, The Times continues to function as the standard bearer, or last bastion, of 
the high modern paradigm of journalism. In writing for a liberal unified public, it attempts 
to strike a measured tone, imagining itself above the fray even while competitors in the 
field engage in a political battle to undermine all that the Times stands for. The Times in 
particular lays claim to a certain monopoly of this cultural capital given its centrality to 
American liberalism as the paper of record. The field’s autonomy and the legacy of jour-
nalism are worth preserving as they
defend the conditions of production necessary for the progress of the universal, while working 
to generalize the conditions of access to that universality. (Bourdieu, 1998: 66)
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Fox News’ and the Tea Party’s assault on the Times represents the foreclosure of the 
universal and the loss of the signifiers of liberal-democracy to a populist exceptionalism.
The New York Times and the Tea Party
To analyse the Times’ treatment of the Tea Party, I conducted a survey of The New York 
Times articles from April 2009 to the end of 2011.2 The analysis is not conducted at the 
level of language and grammar typical of critical discourse analysis rather following 
from discourse and field theory; texts are analysed for their political logics, ontological 
assumptions and the normative polity constructed in them. The Times does not produce 
a singular political logic, rather it frames the range of liberal ontological assumptions in 
the different genres of the broadsheet and embodied in the ensemble of journalists and 
commentators. While the likes of Rich, Bai, Blow and Zernike all stake out different 
ideological positions, each does so in an attempt to embody the ideal of a liberal journal-
istic habitus. Straight news or feature reporting constitutes the bulk of coverage and is 
also the form of journalism most highly linked to the cultural capital of the field. It is in 
these stories where the Times claims to be objectively representing the social world, as 
opposed to opinion pieces that are intended to ‘push the envelope’, framing the range of 
acceptable opinions.
Liberal humanism
The principal reporter on the Tea Party beat, from its emergence in 2009 to the elections 
of November 2010, was Kate Zernike, whose byline was associated with over 50 articles. 
The key ‘scoop’ in Zernike’s (2010d) corpus is a profile of Keli Carender, who the author 
claims is the original source of the movement. The ontological assumptions at work are 
that people may function as an objective source of truth as opposed to simply embodying 
discourses and ideology. The Deweyan ‘truth’ that this humanism presumes is that an 
exploration of the lifeworld that shapes Tea Party knowledge might lead to an under-
standing of our common stake in democracy. However, the closer we get to this populist 
lifeworld the more we encounter fetishism and antagonism. Zernike offers an in-depth 
personal portrait of Carender, her idiosyncrasies and her personal story of putting 
together a protest early in 2009 as the exemplification of the Tea Party’s grassroots mobi-
lization. The article begins:
Seattle – Keli Carender has a pierced nose, performs improve on weekends and lives here in a 
neighborhood with more Mexican grocers than coffeehouses. You might mistake her for the 
kind of young person whose vote powered President Obama to the White House. You probably 
would not think of her as the Tea Party type. (Zernike, 2010d)
The article is a portrayal of democratic empowerment and, in a recurrent theme in 
much of the in-depth feature reporting, draws a parallel between Obama’s 2008 cam-
paign and the Tea Party’s organizing. In this formulation, the political frontier between 
Obama and the Tea Party is proof of the vitality of liberal-democracy, despite the Tea 
Party’s anti-democratic anti-liberal politics.
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Zernike writes of Carender’s ‘frustration’ with government spending and her realiza-
tion that ‘I can do something different … find a new avenue to get my voice out’. This 
portrait of citizen power is said to offer ‘a lens into how the movement has grown, tak-
ing people who were not politically active … and turning them into a force that is rat-
tling both parties’. The characterization of Carender is determined to go beyond the 
common reduction of Tea Partiers as angry older White Americans anxious about 
Obama. And while this reduction tells us little about the novelty of the Tea Party, the 
characterization of the movement as simply the embodiment of liberal-democratic peo-
ple power is equally unsatisfactory.
Throughout Zernike’s articles emerges a consistent narrative of the awakening and 
politicization of everyday people. When her book on the Tea Party was published, she 
was reported saying the movement embodied normative notions of liberal-democracy: ‘I 
was struck that they figured out that the way you get involved in politics … have an 
impact in American politics is to start at the bottom and work your way up’ (Zernike, 
2010b). It is no wonder then that the fiercely conservative Wall Street Journal opinion 
pages lavished praise on Zernike’s book: ‘The book itself is a pleasant surprise. Kate 
Zernike has produced a largely fair and measured account of the populist rebellion 
against Barack Obama’s aggressively liberal presidency’ (Taranto, 2011). Zernike thus 
ascribes no specific significance to the uniquely antagonistic nature of Tea Party dis-
course in accounting for its prominence and offers no value judgement of the radical 
rhetoric of militancy and sacrifice. Her reports are replete with vignettes of ‘stay at home 
moms’ (Zernike, 2010a) such as Anastasia Przybylski or Diane Reimer who quit her job 
to become a Tea Party organizer: ‘Ms. Reimer often wells up talking about her work. 
“I’m respected,” she said, her voice breaking. “I don’t know why. I don’t know what is 
so special. But I’m willing to do it”’ (Zernike, 2010e). These profiles of the Tea Party 
people depict an inclusive movement embodying the redemptive core of American lib-
eral-democracy. What is problematic is that while the Tea Party does consist of volun-
teers, who really do believe, this does not make it the embodiment of liberal-democratic 
people power as surely fascism also has authentic grassroots.
The lauding of the Tea Party’s authenticity is emblematic of the neo-liberal depoliti-
cization of economy and demonstrates the extent to which political economy is the Real 
elided in the Obama/Tea Party frontier. This liberal humanism obscures what is most 
novel in the movement: austerity populism and the fetishization of capitalism in the face 
of capitalist crisis. The inability to recognize this inversion of the traditions of American 
popular struggle leads to absurd formulations of class. In one article profiling the eco-
nomic precarity of some Tea Party activists, Zernike (2010b) writes that ‘the Great 
Depression too, mobilized many middle class people who had fallen on hard times’. This 
statement is indicative of the liberal-humanist notion of the political and populism, as it 
relates to the Great Depression and the New Deal. There is no attempt to conceptualize 
the mobilization of fascism in times of crisis. The Depression saw the Ku Klux Klan 
emerge as one of the largest movements in US history with over 2 million members in 
the 1920s and 1930s (Kazin, 1995: 104). In the liberal-humanist teleology, all populist 
social movements lead towards a strengthening of liberal-democracy. In Zernike’s anal-
ogy of the Great Depression, she assumes that the Tea Party are those affected by the 
recession and share the lineage of the ‘middle class’ who forged the New Deal, a 
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Following a New York Times/CBS poll which found that the Tea Party were in fact slightly 
over-represented by the middle class,3 defined as a class position as opposed to the pro-
ductivist middle fetishized in Tea Party iconography, Zernike (2010c) is perplexed:
It makes sense that people would take to the streets to protest government spending and 
enormous deficits during the Great Recession, when they are feeling economic pain most 
acutely. But the Tea Party supporters now taking to the streets aren’t the ones feeling the pain.
What is striking in this confusion over the language of class is the fundamental 
assumption that those affected by the recession should be mobilized around austerity 
politics, as opposed to stimulus and public works programmes. Zernike’s work demon-
strates an egregious misreading of history, born of neo-liberal post-politics, and a failure 
to consider liberal-democracy in a qualitative sense. The Times’ failure to meet these two 
tangible measures of the field’s cultural capital speaks to a broader crisis within the field.
Zernike’s liberal humanism is the dominant treatment of the movement in the Times’ 
straight coverage. Chief political correspondent Matt Bai brings this discourse to its apo-
gee in a feature article titled ‘D.I.Y. Populism Left and Right’ (2010). Appearing on the 
front page of the Sunday Week in Review section, days before the 2010 election, it pro-
files Tea Party leader, David Kirkham. Bai’s piece begins with a gesture of self-ridicule, 
reaffirming the liberal/populist culture war, characterizing himself as an in-authentic 
liberal:
Generally speaking, Tea Party enthusiasts don’t think much of East Coast media types, and it 
was hard not to consider this fact as David Kirkham slammed his roadster into fifth gear, 
topping out at more than 100 miles per hour as we hurtled toward another curve … As Mr. 
Kirkham expertly maneuvered this car he had designed and built in his factory, I began to 
understand that there was a point to his having invited me along for the ride, and it wasn’t to 
give me a heart attack. The message he seemed to be sending was, We are not who you think we 
are. We are serious people with serious abilities [sic].
The article parallels Kirkham’s productivist entrepreneurial spirit both as an industri-
alist and an influential Tea Party leader in Utah. Kirkham’s ruggedness and ‘D.I.Y.’ spirit 
are said to embody a ‘political awakening that says a lot about grassroots activism in the 
new century’. The article continues with Kirkham’s ‘journey’ to activism, which exem-
plifies the creative and empowering character of today’s new politics. Kirkham’s love of 
roadsters and ‘irrepressible confidence’ are said to have led him to Poland in the 1990s 
where he bought a factory and helped rebuild the shattered lives of people emerging from 
communism. It is this experience that allows him to extrapolate that Obama is ‘a socialist 
… there’s no doubt he’s a statist’, a statement unchallenged by Bai.
Bai effectively reheats the end-of-history discourse that accompanied the neo-liberal 
raiding of the former eastern bloc and unconsciously constructs Kirkham as the John 
Galt frontiersman central to the Tea Party’s capitalist fetish. The article portrays a par-
ticular Tea Party notion of global capitalism in which America is the Mecca of a virtuous 
capitalist moral order. The particular product in question, high-end replica roadsters, is a 
commodity that embodies magical or fetishistic qualities, existing at the heart of 
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Americana. There is no attempt to consider what capitalism really looks like or what 
cultural permutations exist within the Tea Party’s articulation of capitalism. Not only is 
the Randian rebellion in the midst of capitalist crisis not examined, it is normalized by 
The New York Times deploying its cultural capital in rendering the portrait of the authen-
tic people of the Tea Party.
Neo-liberal racism
Much of the opinion pages that supplement the straight reporting of the Tea Party treat 
the movement as political pathology and the acting-out of low-minded human impulses, 
from racism, fear and corruption. The most common argument explaining the Tea Party’s 
malaise is the fear of southern White Republicans to the nation’s shifting demographic 
balance. Columnist Charles Blow deconstructs the Tea Party lament ‘We want our coun-
try back!’ as the last gasp of the Southern Strategy in the face of an irreversible multi-
culturalism. Blow (2010b) writes that the multi-cultural coalition that passed healthcare 
reform is ‘enough to make a good old boy go crazy’. Blow suggests that the remnants of 
Southern White intolerance will soon pass as a necessity of changing demographics: 
‘The Tea Party, my friends, is not the future. You may want “your country back,” but you 
can’t have it’.
There is no question that the Tea Party represent the political forces that have histori-
cally opposed progress for African Americans, and there have been no shortage of racist 
signs and slogans at Tea Party rallies. What the multi-cultural triumphalism of Blow and 
others fails to recognize is the way in which Tea Party discourse represents a neo-liberal 
‘modifying [of] the process of racialization’ (Roberts and Mahtani, 2010: 248). It is 
important to treat the racism of the Tea Party not as a passing fit of incivility but a reflec-
tion of a sustained populist logic that will not simply expire with the older generation. 
Within this neo-liberal, Randian racism ‘blackness’, or the other, is ‘coupled with anti-
market behaviours’ (p. 249). The dehumanized enemy is not marked by ‘race’ but by the 
fetishist imaginary which sees a network of parasites, from socialists, government, aca-
demics to the poor, leeching the productive class in the attempt to destroy capitalism. 
Where this neo-liberal racism is effective is in articulating a universalist antagonistic 
discourse which couples liberal paternalism with the ghetto, as a geographical and cul-
tural ‘outside’. In this way, African American Tea Partiers, from Cain to Carson, are held 
up as examples of the emancipatory, universal promise of the Tea Party’s America. The 
question of whether this is cynical tokenism or worse is not as important as the efficacy 
of antagonistic universalist discourse which permits odious ‘welfare-bashing’ while 
claiming the mantle of the civil rights movement.
The key moment that crystallizes the Tea Party’s contradictory treatment of race, pro-
voking liberals to no end, was Glenn Beck’s appropriation of Martin Luther King’s 1963 
March on Washington, for a Tea Party rally. Proceeding from what has been described by 
Cornel West as the ‘Santa Clausification’ (Shropshire, 2010) of King, the civil rights 
movement has been constructed by the right as merely the bourgeois demand for equality 
of condition before the law. Blow and fellow columnist Bob Herbert are merciless in 
their assessment of Beck as ‘an ignorant, divisive and pathetic figure’, who ‘makes you 
want to take a shower’ (Herbert, 2010) and whose ‘self-aggrandizing threatens to defile’ 
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(Blow, 2010a) the legacy of the civil rights movement. The particular violence that Beck 
and the Tea Party do to King’s legacy is not simply instilling a ludicrous culture of con-
servative victimization, but it is in limiting the definition of the civil rights struggle to 
anti-government activism and consumer boycotts that force the market (as the universal) 
to correct. Blow and Herbert can only comprehend Beck as an opportunist, but cannot 
perceive how he wildly exploits a liberal inability to formulate a political and antagonis-
tic notion of equality, that goes beyond formalism, inclusion or political correctness. 
What makes the Tea Party’s neo-liberal racism effective is the claim to being the perse-
cuted universal class, which aligns with their antagonistic division of the social space 
and offers the emancipatory rhetoric of emancipation.
The Koch brothers
The breakthrough moment in the pathology critique of the Tea Party explaining the sus-
tained rage of the movement was identifying the Koch brothers as key funders. Following 
Jane Mayer’s New Yorker profile of the Koch brothers4, the Tea Party are widely under-
stood as ‘astro-turf’ or the manipulation of misguided souls who give ‘populist cover to the 
billionaires and corporate interests’ (Rich, 2010b). Frank Rich begins one opinion piece by 
deriding the treatment of the movement as authentic, without mentioning his own paper’s 
role, in stating that ‘there’s just one element missing from these snapshots of America’s 
ostensibly spontaneous and leaderless populist uprising: the sugar daddies who are bank-
rolling it’ (Rich, 2010a). Rich traces the lineage of the Koch Brothers – their father was a 
key member of the John Birch Society – to cast them as troglodytes standing against pro-
gress. The pathology of the movement becomes explicable through the rapaciousness of 
the Koch brothers as a corrupting influence upon the body-politic as their ‘radical agendas 
… go well beyond, and sometimes counter to the interests of those who serve as spear-
carriers in the political pageants hawked on Fox’. For Rich, the Tea Partiers are simply the 
duped pawns of the Koch Brothers who ‘must be laughing all the way to the bank knowing 
that working Americans are aiding and abetting their selfish interests’. In this sense, the Tea 
Party are pseudo-agents or the bewildered herd that might be neutralized by some manner 
of liberal technocratic intervention, perhaps campaign finance reform.
While the role of the Koch brothers in providing a well-resourced infrastructure of 
think-tanks and lobbying groups is critical in explaining an institutional credibility 
bestowed upon the movement, it does not explain the ontological question of why Tea 
Partiers really believe with passionate intensity. They are not simply brainwashed and 
exploited by the Koch brothers. Rather, they gain from their resistance a fetishized iden-
tity that shields them from the trauma of capitalist crisis and offers a redemptive mille-
narian narrative of sacrifice and struggle against an enemy. That is why there is no 
necessary humanist awakening or unmasking of the illusory notion of the fetish; it is 
easier to cling to one’s fetish than to accept a disorientation of the symbolic order. While 
the Tea Party’s fundamentalist pursuit of deregulation and austerity clearly serves the 
interests of the Koch brothers, against the economic self-interest of most of the move-
ment, it also secures the fetishized and embattled identity of the Tea Party. The political 
exceeds this humanist/pathology dichotomy, as it both precludes liberal-democratic dia-
logue and its reduction to a corruption of liberal-democracy through fear and avarice.
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Beyond the pale
What marked a critical turning point in the treatment of the Tea Party, following its 2010 
electoral success, was the shooting of Democratic congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. 
The allowances that had been made for it by the liberal-humanist treatment, as a diver-
gent idiosyncratic movement, were revoked as it became necessary for the Times, given 
its position in the field, to call for the restoration of civil discourse. The solemnity of 
this exercise and the Times’ authority to do it required a re-articulation of the ideal of the 
field, as above the fray, with the Times’ chastising cable news, the blogosphere and poli-
ticians on all sides. Matt Bai (2011) writes of a ‘rhetorical recklessness that permeates 
our political moment’ as being driven by an irresponsible mediatized politics on both 
the left and right ‘that so loudly and readily reinforces the dark visions of political 
extremists, often for profit or political gain’. Bai draws an equivalence between Sarah 
Palin’s infamous cross-hairs map and the comments of a left-wing blogger on the Daily 
Kos to condemn all sides as complicit in the debasing of a shared liberal political cul-
ture. He castigates both left and right stating that this recklessness began before the Tea 
Party, on the left, with 9/11 Truthers5 and the opponents of President Bush. In the desire 
to see the Tea Party as the same ‘D.I.Y.’ politics as the coalition that propelled Obama6 
to the White House, the Times either celebrates all sides or castigates all sides. As the 
Times struggles in its coverage to articulate a qualitative or political notion of liberal-
ism, it reverts to a false equivalence which defends nothing except the field’s sense of 
staying above the fray.
From this concern over normative notions of civility and rational discourse in the 
public sphere, the pathology treatment of the Tea Party extends to mark the movement as 
beyond the pale. Following the Giffords shooting, there were misplaced expectations 
that Republicans and the Tea Party might govern in a more conciliatory manner. With 
regard to debt-ceiling negotiations, Paul Krugman (2011) was severe in his reprimand of 
the Tea Party calling them ‘hostage-takers’, ‘extortionists’ and ‘black-mailers’. Not to be 
outdone, Joe Nocera (2011) in his column titled ‘Tea Party’s War on America’, labelled 
the Tea Party ‘terrorists’ in ‘suicide vests’ who ‘have waged jihad on the American peo-
ple’. Maureen Dowd (2011a) in trademark verbose fashion leaves no metaphor behind in 
characterizing a certain Tea Party derangement:
Like gargoyles on the Capitol, the adamantine nihilists are determined to blow up the country’s 
prestige … the Tea Party [is driving] a Thunderbird off the cliff with the president and the 
speaker of the House strapped in the back … The maniacal Tea Party freshman are trying to 
burn down the House they were elected to serve in.
In a second column just 4 days later entitled ‘Washington Chainsaw Massacre’ (Dowd, 
2011b), the debt-ceiling negotiations were likened to a ‘slasher flick’ with ‘the president 
– and the federal government – being chased through dim corridors by a maniacal gang 
with big knives held high’. Dowd continues with a remarkable rhetorical flourish:
They were like cannibals eating their own party leaders alive. They were like vampires … like 
zombies … like metallic beasts in ‘Alien’ flashing mouths of teeth inside other mouths of teeth, 
bursting out of Boehner’s stomach every time he came to a bouquet of microphones.
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Dowd’s rhetorical excess embodies a critical inability of the liberal field to explain the 
Tea Party and a genuine horror of how cherished institutions of liberal-democratic gov-
ernment are being debased. At precisely the point where the Tea Party are designated 
beyond the pale for their defiance of liberal notions of political compromise, the Times 
resorts to a snarkiness that shields liberals from their inability to understand this problem 
in real political terms.
Conclusion
It is clear from this analysis that the modern liberal field of journalism is faced with 
defining ontological questions. In the pursuit of universal truths and an understanding 
which binds the liberal-democratic polity, the field encounters antagonism, fetishism and 
the political. The field has traditionally understood the political as a threat to be over-
come by expert knowledge; however, the failure to properly explain or defend itself from 
the Tea Party represents a threat to this knowledge and cultural capital. Where journalism 
has staked a claim for rationalism, enlightenment, truth-telling and self-reflexivity, pop-
ulism has sought to close the social world while declaring its fetishized people the uni-
versal class. In response, practitioners and researchers in the field should not abandon the 
universal but, as Bourdieu would put it, look to journalism to defend and generalize 
access to universality. It is my hope that the insights gained from discourse theory and its 
notion of the political may be applicable in reimaging journalism’s relationship to nor-
mative liberal-democratic principles.
Explaining the Tea Party is not simply about getting a political story ‘right’, it is 
about delineating the irrational in social life and politics without granting it demo-
cratic legitimacy. There are concrete historical, cultural and economic factors which 
account for the persistence of the Tea Party’s fetishized productivist notion of capi-
talism which should not be beyond the grasp of journalists. However, in examining 
the Times’ treatment of the Tea Party, we encounter the field’s own irrational invest-
ment in a redemptive humanism. Zernike’s reporting embodies a liberal-humanist 
teleology whereby political mobilizations innately strengthen liberal-democracy. 
This reaffirming narrative is depoliticizing, managing to portray the New Deal as 
forged by the middle class presumably mobilized in favour of austerity. Times jour-
nalists are at pains to conflate the Tea Party movement with the same energies that 
propelled Obama to the White House, an analogy that elides the Tea Party’s antago-
nistic mode of politics. Bai engages in this conflation and humanism even up to 
unwittingly reinforcing the Randian mythology that he should be deconstructing and 
contextualizing. Within the entirety of the Times’ coverage, there is a failure to con-
sider the Tea Party’s neo-liberal inversion of populism or to challenge its fetishized 
notion of capitalism.
The Times’ treatment of the political is contained within a humanist/pathology 
dichotomy, with both understanding the political as remedied by the pre-existing tools 
of the field. In the humanist treatment, the expert knowledge of the journalist is 
deployed to enhance communication within the polity. Conversely, the pathology cri-
tique sees the unwelcome intrusion of the political as derived from corruption or base 
human emotions that require technocratic fixes. As the duped spear-carriers for Fox 
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News and the oil industry, the Tea Party are merely symptomatic of a power-politics 
greed that might be corrected by campaign finance reform or a Fairness Doctrine for 
cable news. Even if one concedes that the probability of such reform is unlikely, the 
ontological assumptions of the field remain intact and key questions about Tea Party 
belief remain unexamined.
Where there is pointed criticism of the Tea Party’s irrationalism, this centres on race, 
inter-generational anxieties and retrograde politics. This critique affirms the field as it 
defends the legacy of civil rights, celebrates Obama’s presidency as a triumph of liberal 
inclusion and casts the Tea Party as remnants of history. What it does not recognize is 
how the claim to the civil rights legacy is part of sustained universalist political logic that 
will not simply expire as a necessity of changing demographics. Tea Partiers can imagine 
themselves as the persecuted following in the footsteps of King while engaging in unre-
strained dehumanizing attacks on their enemies. The Tea Party have constructed a neo-
liberal racism which is the inversion of liberal multi-culturalism, substituting explicit 
reference to race with phantasmic images of welfare recipients, academics, the govern-
ment and social democratic ‘tyranny’.
The electoral success of Tea Party Republicans marked a distinct shift in coverage as 
there emerged an expectation in the field for political normalization of the movement. 
The Giffords shooting saw the forceful re-iteration of the media field’s concern for 
civility, toleration and restraint in politics; those elements of Tea Party discourse that 
exceeded normative liberal bounds were increasingly deemed by the Times as beyond 
the pale. Similarly, the Republican/Tea Party congress defied any notion of the loyal 
opposition in pursuing a political brinksmanship that reduced the government’s credit 
rating and caused a government shutdown. Here, the Tea Party are characterized in the 
Times as a genuine threat to liberal-democracy, responsible for the dysfunction of gov-
ernment and a political climate that is both uncivil and charged with the threat of vio-
lence. However, it is precisely at this moment when the Tea Party are at its most 
powerful, riding roughshod over the rest of the country, its own party leaders and even 
important backers such as the Chamber of Commerce, that the Times is at a loss to 
explain the phenomenon. The denunciations of the Tea Party in the Times reach a cre-
scendo of liberal derision representing The New York Times’ attempts to defend the 
field’s notion of liberal-democracy from irresponsible politicians and media such as 
Fox. However, as the tone of coverage becomes more snarky, the defence of the field, 
rather than becoming political, functions as a form of disavowal protecting the field 
from its ontological crisis.
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Notes
1. Fox News was central to promoting and coordinating Tea Party events, and Fox News host 
Glenn Beck, and contributor Sarah Palin, shifted seamlessly between the fields of politics and 
the media in leading the movement (see Jutel, 2013).
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2. Articles were selected from the NYT Topic pages on the Tea Party from between February 
2009 and end 2011. The 240 articles analysed were selected from on the basis of national 
importance (as opposed to political races for state government) and focus on the movement 
in contrast to standard ‘horse-race’ political journalism. Articles were coded as straight 
news, opinion or feature. Neither format was privileged over another but were analysed 
accordingly.
3. On the key issue of economic self-interest and the Bush tax cut for those earning over 
US$250,000 a year, 13 percent of Tea Party supporters’ incomes exceed this threshold com-
pared to 12 percent for non–Tea Party supporters (The New York Times (NYT) and CBS News 
(CBS), 2010).
4. While Mayer is credited with this scoop Mark Ames & Yasha Levine reported on the Koch 
Brothers astro-turf infrastructure 18 months before Mayer.
5. Attributing 9/11 truth to the left as opposed to Ron Paul/Alex Jones libertarians has been a 
recurrent straw man invoked by liberals in response to the Tea Party and the political, includ-
ing John Stewart in his ‘Rally to Restore Sanity’.
6. What this false equivalence critically elides is the explicit unantagonistic discourse of Obama’s 
campaign and the clear antagonistic dichotomy of the Tea Party’s cry to ‘take America back’ 
(see Jutel, 2012).
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